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Brief of Defendant and Appellant 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
That at all times herein Plaintiff was an individ-
ual, doing business as Davis Electric 
That the Defendants, Stanley L. Barrett and Iris 
Barrett, were at all times the owners and reputed 
owners of the real property located in Sevier County, 
State of Utah. 
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That on or about the 1st day of April, 1966, the 
said Defendants, Stanley L. Barrett and Iris Barrett, 
did enter into a written contract with one Pere Peter-
:;on, dlb1 a Timberlan Sales Company, a general 
:::ontractor, who subsequently did enter into a verbal 
contract with the Plaintiff herein to furnish material 
and labor to the premises above described for the 
purpose of constructing a retail store. According to 
said oral contract, Defendant Pere Peterson, dlbla 
Timberlan Sales Company, would pay to the Plaintiff 
the reasonable value of labor and materials furnished 
for said electrical work, and the reasonable value 
would be paid as billed upon completion for the I 
I 
work performed. That in addition to the oral contract I 
entered into with Pere Peterson, the Plaintiff was con- )1 
tacted directly by Defendant Stanley L. Barrett on 
1 or about the 1st day of April, 1966, on the job site, 
and requested that Plaintiff provide further electrical 
services consisting of labor and materials, and that 
the Defendant Stanley L. Barrett did agree to pay for 
said services and materials at the completion of the 
work. 
Between the 13th day of April, 1966, and 
the 29th day of July, 1966, at the special instance 
and request of the Defendants, and particularly the 
Defendant Pere Peterson and the Defendants Stan-
ley L. Barrett and Iris Barrett, the Plaintiff did per· 
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form the work and furnished labor and material for 
the constructlon and improvements on the premises 
as described in his oral agreement, and did the ad-
ditional work and provided the additional materials 
as required by Defendant Stanley L. Barrett, at a 
total reasonable value of $7,861.15. That Defendants 
have refused to pay a balance due of $1,861.15. 
A lien was timely filed and the action brought 
to perfect the lien, for judgment, for principal, costs, 
and attorney's fees and interest. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Lower Court granted judgment to Plaintiff 
against Defendant Pere Peterson dlbl a Timberlan 
Sales Company, for the sum of $1,861.15, plus interest 
to date of judgment, attorney's fees in the amount 
of $518.0lJ, but denied any judgment against De-
fendants Barrett and denied the validity of the lien. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks judgment against Defendant Stan-
ley L. Barrett for $1,861.15, interest, costs and attor-
ney's fees, and seeks to have his lien declared valid 
as to the described property. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
About April 1, 1966, Defendants Stanley L. Bar-
rett and Iris Barrett entered into a written contract 
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with Defendant Pere Peterson, dlbl a Timberlan Sales 
Company (R-95) (Defendant's Exhibit D) as a general 
contractor, to bui]d a building to be used for a gro-
cery store in Salina, Utah. The written contract pro-
vided for a_ "turn-key job." Defendants Barrett under-
stood "turn-key job" to mean that the building would 
be complete in all respects and that the contractor 
would hand to Barrett a key at the completion of the 
building. Peterson claimed that his contract did not 
include the installation of electrical connections for 
certain refrigeration equipment (R-59). 
Peterson employed the Plaintiff on an oral con-
tract to do the electrical work which the Plaintiff did 
according to specifications contained in the plans. 
The Plaintiff was at the job site making electrical 
connections on the day that the refrigeration equip-
ment arrived and was installed by one Scott who 
was one of the witnesses in this case. In order for 
the equipment to be installed, it was necessary to 
do some additional electrical work. Mr. Peterson 
was not present. Mr. Barrett was present and claimed 
that the additional electrical work was the responsi-
bility of the contractor, Mr. Peterson. Mr. Scott of 
the refrigeration company affirmed that the electrical 
work was not his responsibility. The Plaintiff, Wil-
liam V. Davis, stated that he was employed to do 
the work which was on the specifications and this 
did not include the additional electrical connections 
for the installation of the refrigeration equipment. 
Finally, Mr. Barrett stated for Mr. Davis to go ahead 
and do the wiring, in other words, to get the store 
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open, a.nd if there was any discrepancy about who 
was going to pay for it, he would deduct the amount 
from Mr. Peterson's contract {R-46). 
The Plaintiff then proceeded to do the elec-
trical wiring work required. He has been paid the 
amount of the original contract price as covered by 
the specifications, but both Defendants Peterson and 
Barrett have refused to pay the amount necessary to 
do the extra work. 
In paying the total balance due to the Plaintiff, 
except the amount due on the extras, the Plaintiff 
granted a lien release in the amount of $2,800.00 
only (Defendant's Exhibit C and Plaintiff's Exhibit 
4). The lien release there granted clearly states that 
the Plaintiff was not releasing his lien with respect 
to any sums due in excess of the $2,800.00. 
When the Plaintiff was not paid fully for his 
services, he filed with the Sevier County Recorder 
a Notice of Lien under recording no. 160611 in Book 
A-27, page 623 of the records of Sevier County Re-
corder's off1ice on September 26, 1966. The amount 
of the lien was in the amount of $4,861.15. Certain 
amounts were paid after the lien was filed, leaving 
a balance due and owing of $1,861.15. This amount 
was never paid and this action was commenced 
within the one-year period allowed by law (R-1). 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT A 
JUDGMENT AGAINST THE DEFENDANT BARRETT 
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IN THE FULL AMOUNT REQUESTED AND IN FAIL-
ING TO SUSTAIN A LIEN AGAINST THE PROPERTY 
OF THE DEFENDANTS BARRETT. 
POINT I 
THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE 
SHOWS THAT DEFENDANT BARRETT HIMSELF 
TOLD PLAINTIFF THAT PLAINTIFF WOULD BE PAID 
FOR THE EXTRAS. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT BARRE TT AUTHORIZED THE 
EXTRAS, AND THE LIEN \VAS TIMELY FILED AND 
COMPLIED WITH ALL STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS 
FOR VALIDITY. 
POINT III 
THE LIEN WAIVER SPECIFICALLY EXCEPTED 
THE EXTRAS AND DOES NOT WAIVE THE LIEN FOR 
ANY BALANCE NOT PAID. 
POINT I 
The determination of the issue under this Point 
should be fairly simple, and would follow the sug-
gestion of the Court on page 55 of the record in 
which the Court states: 
"It seems to me that proof can be pretty 
much limited to whether or not some additional 
services were performed and who agreed to 
pay for them." 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 4 was submitted for identifica-
tion and accepted in evidence showing a list of the 
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extras whkh were performed on the job. Nowhere 
in the record was this list basically refuted and it 
was accepted as the basis of the judgment granted 
against Pere Peterson by the Court. With respect to 
these extras, the Plaintiff stated on page 58 of the 
record, lines 24 and 25: 
By the Court-
Q-You say you were called upon; by whom 
were you called upon to do this extra work, 
Pere or who? 
A-No, Mr. Peterson was very seldom on the 
job when I was there, and all the extras 
that I have here were ordered by the 
owner. 
Q-By Mr. Barrett? 
A-Yes, Sir. 
Q-And did he order them of you or of your 
employees? 
A-He ordered them through-some of them 
was ordered through an employee of mine, 
but the majority of them through me per-
sonally. 
Q-By Mr. Barrett? 
A-Yes, Sir. 
In further explanation of the itemied work on 
page 60 of the record the Plaintiff stated: 
B 
''I was ordered to work with Mr. Scott on 
this, under his direction, and those were the 
things that he needed by Mr. Barrett." 
On page 61 of the record: 
Q-Now referring again to those items opposite 
"r", you stated that you were ordered by 
Mr. Barrett to work with Mr. Scott and 
provide for what Mr. Scott needed? 
A-Yes, Sir. 
Q-And did you do that? 
A-Yes, Sir. 
On page 62 0£ the record: 
A-Well, Mr. Scott brought out that it was 
definitely not part or included in his con-
tract for the wiring and I brought out also 
that it was not included on my plans or 
part of my contract. And at this time Mr. 
Barrett said that he would see I was taken 
care of and to go ahead and do it. 
On page 77 of the record, counsel for Defendant 
Barrett questions Plaintiff: 
Q-Y ou are claiming some contract today 
against Mr. Barrett, are you not? 
A-Yes, Sir-a verbal contract. 
On page 88 of the record: 
Q-Would you like to tell me again what Mr. 
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Barrett said at the time or what was said 
by the parties? 
A-Well, it was Mr. Scott brought out that it 
wa:'\ not his obligation or his contract to 
wire these machines or the electrical por-
tion of this, and I said it was not in my 
contract either, and so it needed to be 
done, and Mr. Barrett said to go ahead and 
he would see that I was taken care of on it. 
On page 130 of the record Mr. Scott testifies, be-
ginning on line 15: 
Q-Now could you tell me, Mr. Scott, whether 
or not you had or were present at any con-
versation between yourself and Mr. Bar-
rett or Mr. Davis and Mr. Barrett concern-
ing the charges for this work necessary for 
the installation of that refrigeration equip-
ment? 
A-Yes. 
Q-Is it possible for you to establish when that 
conservation took place if you remember? 
A-To establish the exact day would be very 
difficult because of the lapse of time. 
Q-'With respect to when you started to do 
your work, could you tell me approximate-
ly what happened? 
A-I would say a conversation took place in 
the early part of July at the time the fix-
tures were being moved into the place and 
the need arose to have them all hooked up. 
Q-Can you tell me who was present? 
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A-Mr. Barrett, Mr. Davis and myself. 
Q-And yourself. 
A-There were other workmen around, but I 
don't recall them being in the conversa-
tion. 
Q-Can you tell me what was said? 
A-When we started moving the fixtures into 
position, the fact came up, brought up by 
Mr. Davis that he had nothing figured for 
installing these fixtures, also the alarm 
system, the heating and air-condition con-
trols the various equipment that it took 
to make a grocery store, and he of course 
looked to me for payment. I told Mr. Davis 
at the time that we did not include this in 
my contract. I have my original proposals 
that I made to Mr. Barrett and Associated 
Foods Stores in my portfolio there if the 
need arises to look at them, but we did not 
include the electrical with my equipment, 
and at that time Mr. Barrett and Bill and 
myself discussed this matter from this 
conversation I arrived or not arrived at, 
but from the conversation. 
Q-Could you tell us what the conversation 
was? 
A-We were talking about of course who was 
going to pay for it, and I told him that I 
wasn't going to pay for it. Mr. Barrett in-
dicated that he bought a "turn-key job", 
and he didn't feel that he should have to 
pay for it, and at the end of the conversa-
tion Mr. Barrett stated for Mr. Davis 
to go ahead and do this wiring in order, in 
other words, to get the store open, and 
1: 
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then if there was a discrepancy in about 
who was going to pay for it, he would 
deduct that amount from Mr. Peterson's 
contract. Now as much as my memory can 
serve me that's the way the conversation 
progressed. 
The Defendant Barrett testified beginning on 
page 146 of the record: 
Q-About when was the first of these conversa-
tions, Mr. Barrett. 
A-Probably the latter part of June, first of 
July. It was just before we was getting 
ready to open, and we were in a hurry, in 
fact we were just a month late in getting 
opened, and the equipment came in and 
they wouldn't connect it up. I asked Davis 
if he wouldn't connect it, and he said no, 
it wasn't on the contract. I said, well it was 
on somebody's contract. 
Q-Who was there at the time? 
A-Just I and Mr. Scott. 
Q-And was Mr. Davis there, too? 
A-Yes, and Mr. Davis-the three of us. 
Q-All right, now go ahead and give us the con-
versation. 
A-I said that it was on somebody's contract. 
He said my contract was fully covered-all 
the wiring, all the installation. Mr. Davis 
had the wiring. Mr. Scott had all the in-
stallation. To my understanding that was 
the complete wiring-not just partially. 
Q-Now is that what you told him at the time? 
A-Yes, Sir. I said I don't know who is 
to pay for it, but I'm not. 
Q-And did you make any other statements 
about withholding money on the contract? 
A-I said it would be up to Pere because he was 
on the contract, and my contract called for 
complete wiring. 
Q-Do you recall any conversation in which you 
told Mr. Davis that you would personally 
assume these items he is talking about? 
A-No, I did not. 
Q-Then your testimony is, as I understand it, 
that as a matter of fact you told him you 
weren't responsible. 
A-That's right. 
Q-Now in the early stages of this contract, in 
the planning, were you present in any meet-
ings where the equipment and hook-up 
were discussed with Mr. Peterson. 
A-No. 
Notwithstanding the above testimony of De· 
fendant Barrett, he also testified beginning on page 
151 of the record that he directed the Plaintiff to in-
stall certain pieces of equipment and to do certain 
work (R-151). Defendant Barrett also admitted the 
items on Exhibit 1 of Plaintiff were installed by the 
Plaintiff and that Defendant Barrett received the 
benefit of the installation. 
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POINT II 
The formal requirements of the filing of the lien 
of the Plaintiff were not contested by Defendants 
Barrett except to claim that a lien waiver and re-
lease had been given to the Defendant Barrett by 
the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff's Notice of Lien was filed 
on September 26, 1966 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2). 
The Plaintiff himself was doing work on the 
premises. The work on the job was terminated in 
October, 1966 {R-64). The charges made were reason-
able {R-143, line 27). In addition, no attack was made 
either in the pleadings or in testimony as to the 
reasonableness of the charges. 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, Title 
38-1-3 states: 
Contractors, sub-contractors and all persons 
performing labor upon or furnishing materials 
in the construction or alteration or addition to 
or repair of any building, structures or improve-
ment . . . shall have a lien upon the property 
upon or concerning which they have rendered 
service, performed labor or furnished materials 
for the value of the services rendered, labor 
performed or materials furnished by each, re-
espectively, whether at the instance of .the own-
er or of any other person acting as his agent, 
(emphasis ours) contractors or otherwise. 
Within the meaning of the statute, the Plaintiff 
is entitled to file a lien. Under Title 38-1-7, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended, and under Title 
38-1-11, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, all 
of the requirements of Law as to filing and initiating 
foreclosures were honored and complied with. 
POINT III 
The Defendants Barrett rely heavily upon a pur-
ported lien release designated a_s Defendant's Ex-
hibit C and Plaintiff's Exhibit 4. It is not necessary 
to go deeply into this purported line waiver as on 
its face it shows that it does not waive any liens 
except for the amount of labor and material as per 
contract only. Since the amount which has not been 
paid and for which this action was brought was for 
extras beyond the contract, this lien waiver is not 
applicable. In the 5th line the Plaintiff specifically 
states that the waiver is "for electrical labor and 
materials on new building as per contract only.'' 
Plaintiff also states "Payment is not received for 
extra work performed and materials furnished in ad· 
dition to contracted labor and materials." (Emphasis 
ours.) 
Then in the middle of the paragraph below, in 
addition to other things, the Plaintiff states that he 
grants a waiver for the contract price of $2,800.00 , 
only. Then in order to clarify he states: "I hereby 
specifically reserve any and all rights I may have 
or may be entitled to under and by virtue of the 
mechanics and materials lien laws of the State of 1 
Utah by reason of extra labor performed and mate-
rials furnished by me to said property or in connec-
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tion, over and above the said contract price of 
$2,800.00. It is also testified to on page 72 of the record 
in a discussion between the Court and counsel in 
which the Court recognises in lines 12, 13 and 14: 
"Of course the conditional release apparently 
would indicate there was $2,800.00 due and said 
nothing about the $1,861.15." 
On page 107 of the record, lines 15, 16 and 17, 
discussion of the $2,800.00 payment was conducted 
and questions propounded of Mr. Pere Peterson: 
Q-Now there was an additional $2,800.00 pay-
ment that was testified to. Could you tell 
me whether that was also a payment to be 
credited to you or was that a payment of 
Mr. Barrett's? 
A-It was credited to my total contract. 
Q-Could you tell me whether or not that was 
a payment on the $6,000.00 contract? 
A-Yes, it was. 
Q-Can you tell me whether or not that was a 
payment on extras? 
A-That was not. 
It follows that if in fact extras on the contract 
were ordered by the Defendant Barrett, the pur-
ported lien release and waiver waives nothing be-
yond those items contained in the original contract, 
and shows no credit as against the amount claimed 
to be due by the Plaintiff. 
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CONCLUSION 
In the amended decision of the Lower Court, the 
Court quotes testimony by Scott, and the Court 
states: 
" ... the only theory under which the Plaintiff 
can a claim against Barrett is on some 
oral promise. The testimony of the witness Scott 
is the most persuasive concerning this matter ... 
(Scott: In other words to get the store opened, 
and then if there was a discrepancy on about 
who was going to pay for it, he would deduct 
that amount from Peterson's contract . . . ) It 
negatives any promise to pay on the part of 
Barrett." 
It seems to us that Scott's testimony shows just 
what the Court says it does not show: that Barrett 
promised to pay. 
The issues before this Court are very simple 
questions of fact: 
1. If Davis did the work for Peterson as a sub-
contractor under Peterson's "turn-key job", then 
Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment against Peterson 
and a lien against the property. 
2. If Davis did the work at the direction of 
Barrett or the promise of Barrett that he would pay, 
Davis is entitled to a judgment against Barrett and 
a lien against the property. 
Notwithstanding the dispute as to the interpreta· 







Barret and Peterson, the Plaintiff did the work on 
the premises as part of the job. The work he did 
was extra and he is entitled to a judgment and to 
a lien on the property. 
There is no testimony to sustain any other posi-
tion. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LORIN N. PACE 
HARRIS, RUNYAN & PACE 
336 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellants 
